It was a fine day, dear reader, as I departed from my abode, skipping lightly down the staircase as I merrily whistled ``The Battle Hymn of the Republic.'' It was jolting down these fated steps, reader, when I had an epiphany.

It was as though my hermeneutical grundlage fell out from underneath me. My modernistic tendecies, my archimedian standpoint, yeah my simplistic foundationalistic epistemology, dissolved into the void of nothingness. I suddenly knew the irreducable otherness of the other.

As I stood there, wordering in silence, Thomas Kuhn appeared before me. ``Science,'' he said, ``is simply a series of attempts to approximate the reality of nature herself, which is completely unreducible. The practice of normal science continues until inconsistencies reach a critical level, after which we see the formation of new paradigms.''

``But sir,'' I said. ``Doesn't this leave us in a position of epistemic despair? And doesn't the rapid increase in techonology lend support to the legitimacy of science?''

``Fool!'' he replied, ``Don't you see that technology is simply the manifestation of reproducable science? This lends no support to non-reproducable science. It's an issue of phenomena, not nomena. And as for epistemic pessimism, we need not dispute the indisputable. Rather, we must accept that our scientific knowledge is at best an approximation.''

I finally understood. It was that issue which Kant had first pointed out, that our minds impose order upon reality, giving us structure, but perhaps including distortion. Time and space, those fundamental elements of reality (for indeed how easy is it for a physicist to use t in an equation without knowing what it really means), are imposed by the mind.